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“Both of the mainline German parties, Deutscher Nationalverband and the Christian Socials, realized that the only meaningful route to constitutional revision would be through a renewal of their pre-war political alliance. In March 1916 the Nationalverband published its program, entitled Der Standpunkt des Deutschen Nationalverbandes zur Neuordnung der Dinge in Österreich. It combined vituperative rhetoric against the Slavs (‘the state must be released from the unbearable Slavic hegemony’) with detailed practical suggestions, including proposals for laws establishing German as the inner language of service and communication (innere Amts- und Verkehrssprache) in all courts and administrative instances; regulations specifying that graduates in all state universities, including the Czech university in Prague, had to pass one of their state examinations in German; and, along with a general reform of the civil service, the creation of language-specific regional administrative areas in Bohemia that were synonymous with the longstanding German demand for linguistically demarcated Kreise.”
[1]
[1]: (Boyer 2022: 517-518) Boyer, John W. 2022. Austria, 1867–1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/CG3P4KKD |
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As the Communist Party itself became bureaucratized and as the more enthusiastic revolutionary leaders were eliminated, special industrial academies were set up for party members who had shown administrative talent. With the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32) the status of civil servants was improved, and their conditions of service were made less rigid, even though the party never relaxed its tight system of control over all branches of the state apparatus. In 1935 the State Commission on the Civil Service was created and attached to the Commissariat of Finance with responsibility for ensuring general control of personnel practice. This commission laid down formal patterns of administrative structure, reformed existing bureaucratic practices, fixed levels of staffing, standardized systems of job classification, and eliminated unnecessary functions and staff. The inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance ensured that the commission’s general policies were carried out in the ministries. The commission itself remained under the close supervision of the Council of People’s Commissars to ensure that it complied with party directives, and the commission’s members were appointed directly by the council.
[1] [1]: (Public Administration - Soviet Union, Bureaucracy, Planning | Britannica) Zotero link: FARM9XPB |
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No examination system in Roman bureaucracy.
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The following excerpts summarise the early development of Ottoman bureaucracy. They seem to suggest that at this stage, not only were only some elements of bureaucracy in place rather than the whole system, which came later, but what bureaucracy existed was patrimonial rather than involving the kind of rigorous training that would involve an examination.
"The Ottoman bureaucracy is defined here as the men who were paid to manage the affairs of the government: specifically the members of the scribal service and financial officers (kalemiye), along with the ubiquitous secretaries who accompanied every bureau in the empire. […] It is not until the reign of Süleyman in the sixteenth century that the kalemiye and the government as a whole may properly be called a bureaucracy. As the Ottoman armies pushed west into Hungary and Austria and south and east to the Indian Ocean, the influx of new territories brought about increases in the bureaucracy’s size, influence and degrees of specialization and professionalization. So while the origins of the Ottoman bureaucracy lay in the patrimonial house of the sultan and while its general contours reflect this fact, the administration developed characteristics of an impersonal, predictable and rationalized organization as it expanded. This process of bureaucratization did not come about immediately or easily. It took time, and people continued to rely on patrimonial relations to advance in rank while adopting bureaucratic styles. The transition mostly took place during Süleyman’s reign, although, once established, bureaucracy continued to coexist with elements of patrimonialism for centuries. […] Looking at the core regions of the empire, we quickly get a sense of the bureaucratic features of Ottoman rule that had formed by the end of the sixteenth century. In these regions, administrators and judges were appointed from the capital on a rotating basis, rules of office were codified and passed down, training was formalized, career lines and hierarchies were present, and universalistic principles as well as an ‘ethos’ of office – being an Ottoman bureaucrat – were all in evidence. Elements of the system – which had roots in the traditions of Near Eastern and Islamic governance as well as Byzantine land practices – were already discernable in the fourteenth century when the house of Osman was still an Anatolian principality." [1] [1]: (Barkey 2016: ) Barkey, K. 2016. The Ottoman Empire (1299–1923): The Bureaucratization of Patrimonial Authority. In Crooks and Parsons (ed) Empires and Bureaucracy in World History: From Late Antiquity to the Twentieth Century pp. 102-126. Cambridge University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/JGQJ29PI/library |
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"While the necessary reliance on archaeological evidence has ensured that many aspects of Harappan civilization, such as economic activities, settlements, industry, and biological anthropology, have been investigated as well as or better than those of literate civilizations, the absence of intelligible documentary material is a major handicap to understanding Harappan social and political organization and has put some aspects of Harappan life, such as the law, quite beyond cognizance."
[1]
[1]: (McIntosh 2008: 245) Jane McIntosh. 2008. The Ancient Indus Valley. Santa Barbara; Denver; Oxford: ABC-CLIO. |
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Unclear.
Nizami suggests a rudimentary bureaucratic system before the conquest of Ghazna--likely, perhaps, one that did not rely on an examination system. “Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. […] The vizier was the head of the civil administration.” [1] Thomas suggests that nepotism was prevalent in higher administrative ranks, which perhaps suggests that it was present all the way down the ladder as well. Moreover, Thomas briefly refers to the lack of a robust, coherent centralized imperial administrative structure. “… in the center and west of the Ghurid empire, Ghiyath al-Din continued the Ghurid tradition of assigning appanages, or provinces, to his relatives, who displayed varying degrees of loyalty and were prone to flee in the face of adversity. This lack of a robust, coherent centralized imperial administrative structure contributed to the demise of the dynasty and its empire.” [2] At the same time, Husseini points to the existence of bureaucratic officials, though much key information about them appears to be unknown, including whether they received a state salary, which would help us determine whether or not they were professional, and therefore may have received some sort of official training. Equally, however, Husseini does suggest that the role of muqaddam may have been assigned to people for their knowledge of a region rather than through nepotism. “Persian documents from Ghur offer new information on the administrative role of the Ghurid Muqaddam. In all the relevant documents, the term Muqaddam is specifically associated with the village (qarya). The Muqaddam was an influential person within his village, had good knowledge of his region, and was recognized as the village headmen by the administration in Ghur. In KMS 36, the Muqaddams of a place called Bandalizh are mentioned alongside the notables (Khwajagān), suggesting that the Muqaddams were important figures in their villages. In some documents they are praised with a specific formula, dāma ʿizzahum (“may their glory continue!”). Possibly, their knowledge about the village and their social position as local notables paved the way for them to be the Muqaddam. “Whether the Muqaddam was appointed by the state is not clear from the KMS documents. However, the Muqaddam is mentioned in documents issued by the fiscal department suggesting that he worked for the state. Whether the Muqaddam received a state salary or was entitled to a portion of the yield is also not mentioned. It is also not known if the state share was taken after the harvest was collected and winnowed or before that. In any case, the Muqaddam was allowed to borrow grain from the government stores if he needed it. We know this because one of the KMS documents include a letter in which certain Muqaddams are ordered to return the grain that they borrowed. “The main responsibility of the Muqaddam was to collect ʿushr when it was ready and to check if his village paid the state share in full.33 In KMS 34, the Muqaddams of Bandalizh were asked to make sure that all ordinary (ʿām) and elite (khās)̣ people paid the taxes.34 The collection of ʿushr was done in the presence of the state’s agent, the Muʿtamid. The Muqaddam had no right to collect the state share without the Muʿtamid’s presence and without his direct supervision.” [3] [1]: (Nizami 1999, 194) K A Nizami. The Ghurids. M S Asimov. C E Bosworth. eds. 1999. History of Civilizations of Central Asia. Volume IV. Part One. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited. Delhi. [2]: Thomas, David C. 2016. Ghurid Sultanate. In MacKenzie (ed) The Encyclopedia of Empires. John Wiley & Sons. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/EJJTSHCM/library [3]: (Husseini 2021, 98-99) Husseini, Said Reza. 2021. The Muqaddam Represented in the pre-Mongol Persian Documents from Ghur. Afghanistan 4(2): 91–113. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/ID6DBB75/library |
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“Historians tend to believe that the imperial civil service examinations, one of China’s greatest contributions to the world, were a creation of the Sui and Tang dynasties. However, following Han dynasty precedents, civil service examinations were regularly administered and matured during the Six Dynasties period. Hence, the Sui–Tang examination system merely built upon the foundation laid in the early medieval period.”
[1]
[1]: (Knapp 2019: 493) Knapp, K. N. 2019. Confucian Learning and Influence. In Dien and Knapp (eds) The Cambridge History of China Volume 2: The Six Dynasties, 220–589 pp. 483-510. Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/T27BIUK7/library |
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This code should not reflect the colonial administration. The Hmong population was subject to Chinese administrative integration even before the republican period: ’From Song on, in periods of relative peace, government control was exercised through the tusi system of indirect rule by appointed native headmen who collected taxes, organized corvée, and kept the peace. Miao filled this role in Hunan and eastern Guizhou, but farther west the rulers were often drawn from a hereditary Yi nobility, a system that lasted into the twentieth century. In Guizhou, some tusi claimed Han ancestry, but were probably drawn from the ranks of assimilated Bouyei, Dong, and Miao. Government documents refer to the "Sheng Miao" (raw Miao), meaning those living in areas beyond government control and not paying taxes or labor service to the state. In the sixteenth century, in the more pacified areas, the implementation of the policy of gaitu guiliu began the replacement of native rulers with regular civilian and military officials, a few of whom were drawn from assimilated minority families. Land became a commodity, creating both landlords and some freeholding peasants in the areas affected. In the Yunnan-Guizhou border area, the tusi system continued and Miao purchase of land and participation in local markets was restricted by law until the Republican period (1911-1949).’
[1]
’Throughout the Republican period, the government favored a policy of assimilation for the Miao and strongly discouraged expressions of ethnicity. Southwestern China came under Communist government control by 1951, and Miao participated in land reform, collectivization, and the various national political campaigns.’
[1]
The quasi-feudal Yi nobility was rewarded with labour services performed by the Hmong tenants working their land and not subject to formal examination. Officials serving in the military and civilian administrations were likely examined, as suggested by the degree of formalization presented in primary and secondary sources: ’Like Kweiyang, the hsien city of Lung-li was in an open plain, but a narrow one. The space between the mountains was sufficient for a walled town of one long street between the east and west gates and one or two on either side. There were fields outside the city walls. Its normal population was between three and four thousand, augmented during the war by the coming of some “companies” for the installation and repair of charcoal burners in motor lorries and the distillation of grain alcohol for fuel, an Army officers’ training school, and the engineers’ corps of the railway being built through the town from Kwangsi to Kweiyang. To it the people of the surrounding contryside, including at least three groups of Miao and the Chung-chia, went to market. It was also the seat of the hsien government and contained a middle school, postal and telegraph offices, and a cooperative bank, with all of which the non-Chinese, as well as the Chinese, had some dealings. A few of the more well-to-do families sent one of their boys to the middle school. Cases which could not be settled in the village or by the lien pao official, who was also a Chinese, were of necessity brought to the hsien court, as well as cases which involved both Miao and Chinese.’
[2]
The administration relied on clerks and other professionals, as evidenced in primary sources: ’Article 9. The secretary of the Bureau will receive his orders from the chief of the Bureau, and will attend to such matters as the writing of official despatches of the Bureau, the keeping of the archives, and directing the copying of documents. Article 10. The clerks will receive orders from the chief of the Bureau, and, under the direction of the department head, will assist in carrying out the various duties of the department. Article 11. The copyists will receive their orders from the chief of the Bureau and the departmental heads, and, under the direction of department members and the secretary, shall be responsible for copying despatches and telegrams.’
[3]
We have provisionally assumed that petty officials in the military bureaucracy were subject to some form of examination and merit promotion. This is open to re-evaluation.
[1]: Diamond, Norma: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Miao [2]: Mickey, Margaret Portia 1947. “Cowrie Shell Miao Of Kweichow”, 40b [3]: Ling, Shun-sheng, Yifu Ruey, and Lien-en Tsao 1947. “Report On An Investigation Of The Miao Of Western Hunan”, 179 |
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There was no examination system.
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inferred from discussion of sources of development/introduction in later periods
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Various ’public works’ are suggestive of some form of administrative organization, but not sufficient to justify coding full-time bureaucrats present.
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Mamluk slaves trained and likely tested and advanced on merit but career depended on master achieving office. No centralized examination system for the government. needs to be checked
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unknown? originally coded as uncertain_absent_present
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Not encountered any reference to an examination system.
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No information found in sources so far.
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In theory university qualifications were required for many top posts in government.
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through university examinations
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In other words, being literate was sufficient.
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through the universities
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The Omanhene was chosen from royal lineages and assisted by multiple officials: ’The several Akan peoples each consist of a single kingdom ruled by a king, OMANHENE (lit. "state-chief"). The king comes from whatever clan provides the royal line in a particular kingdom, and is chosen in rotation from one of this clan’s kingly lineages (there are often other, non-kingly, lineages within a royal clan). He is elected by various officials, of which the most important is the OHEMMAA (or similar terms; lit. "woman-chief" and usually translated in the literature as "queen-mother") although she is typically not the actual mother but a senior woman of the clan, who "knows" genealogy and may have her own court and be assisted by various officials. Criteria for the selection of a king include assumed competence, general personality, and the fact that kingly lines usually rotate in providing the king. Once selected, the king is "enstooled"-that is, seated upon the stool of kingship. His former status is annulled symbolically, his debts and lawsuits are settled, his clothing and personal possessions st ored; he is then symbolically reborn and given the identity of one of his forebears. He assumes the royal name and title borne by that previous ruler. A king has his palace, in which work members of his court. Details vary considerably, but, in general, the royal officials comprise several categories: those from the royal clan itself; those representing the remainder of the people; and ritual officials, drummers, and others who were considered the "children" of the king, being recruited from many sources, including royal slaves, and often observing patrilineal descent. The king is a sacred person. He may not be observed eating or drinking and may not be heard to speak nor be spoken to publicly (speaking only through a spokesman or "linguist," OKYEAME). He is covered from the sky by a royal umbrella, avoids contact with the earth by wearing royal sandals, and wears insignia of gold and elaborate and beautiful cloth of royal design. In the past, an Akan king held power over the life and death of his subjects and slaves. These powers were eroded during colonial rule, but today an Akan king remains extremely powerful, representing his people both politically an d ritually and acting as a focus for the identity of his kingdom. By far the most powerful is the king of Ashanti, who has the largest of all the Akan kingdoms, the Asantehene at Kumasi.’
[1]
Councillors aided the Omanhene in judicial matters, but there was no formalized system of examination or merit promotion for them: ’But as a man attracts the favourable attention of the observant ones of his tribe, as he more and more impresses the people by his ability in their public gatherings, by the soundness of his opinion, by the depth of his knowledge of the customary laws and traditions, by his skill in public debate, by his keen interest in public affairs, by his bravery or warlike qualities, or by some other qualifications, he acquires public influence, and is accepted, in a greater or less degree, as a public man, representative of a portion of the community. Success in trade, or other personal attributes, are likewise qualifications for this post. The position of such a person is definitely confirmed when the head ruler with his council invites him to be a councillor. Attending an Omanhene or Ohene are always to be found some councillors, who assist him in hearing and determining lawsuits and administering justice. In the town of the [Page 11] Omanhene these men perform many of the duties of officers, who in European countries are known as ministers of state. It is worthy of note that, as a general rule, a Tufuhene is not a member of the Council (Begwa) of the Ohene or Omanhene.’
[2]
[1]: Gilbert, Michelle, Lagacé, Robert O. and Skoggard, Ian: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Akan [2]: Sarbah, John Mensah 1968. “Fanti National Constitution: A Short Treatise On The Constitution And Government Of The Fanti, Asanti, And Other Akan Tribes Of West Africa Together With A Brief Account Of The Discovery Of The Gold Coast By Portuguese Navigators, A Short Narration Of Early English Voyages, And A Study Of The Rise Of British Gold Coast Jurisdiction, Etc., Etc.”, 10p |
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The White Rajahs themselves have been characterized as ’benevolent autocrats’ and were accordingly not formally examined as such: ’Sir Charles Anthony Johnson Brooke (b. June 3, 1829, Berrow, Somerset, Eng.-d. May 17, 1917, Cirencester, Gloucestershire), who adopted the surname Brooke, became the second raja. The government of Charles Brooke has been described as a benevolent autocracy. Charles himself had spent much of his life among the Iban people of Sarawak, knew their language, and respected their beliefs and customs. He made extensive use of down-river Malay chiefs as administrators, and encouraged selective immigration of Chinese agriculturalists, while the dominant indigenous group, the Ibans, were employed in military service. In general, social and economic changes were limited in impact, shielding the inhabitants from both the benefits and the hardships of Western-style development.’
[1]
But the administrators employed in their developing bureaucracy probably were: ’Sir Charles Vyner de Windt Brooke (b. Sept. 26, 1874, London-d. May 9, 1963, London) was the third and last “white raja” (1917-46). He joined the Sarawak administration in 1897. After World War I, a boom in rubber and oil drew Sarawak further into the world economy, and for that and other reasons the state embarked on gradual modernization of its institutions. Public services were developed, a Sarawak penal code modelled on that of British India was introduced in 1924, and there was some extension of educational opportunity.’
[1]
The regional-level positions introduced for the Iban specifically were subject to appointment or election, not examination: ’The appointment to Penghulu is salaried. Before the Japanese occupation it was made by the government for life; Penghulus are now appointed for a limited period (of five years) on the basis of a local election. Although the office is not hereditary, it is not uncommon for the Penghulu to be succeeded by his son or other relative. This is especially true when a Penghulu has been conspicuously successful in office. Since profound knowledge of customary law and precedent, respected judgement, and wide acquaintance with the area administered are prerequisites, the son, son-in-law, or other close relative of a retiring Penghulu is considered more likely to possess these than any other person. The tendency is, therefore, to look first for suitable candidates among the Penghulu’s immediate relatives, and only if these are found wanting, to seek elsewhere. Where a particular Penghulu has lost public respect, a rival leader for the area may evolve, and he naturally becomes a strong candidate for the succession.’
[2]
[1]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/Brooke-Raj [2]: Jensen, Erik 1974. “Iban And Their Religion”, 23 |
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Village-level leaders such as headmen or elders were not subject to examination, but chosen locally even in the post-colonial period: ‘After Playfair, we get some accounts on the institution of nokma by Robbins Burling (1963), D.N. Majumdar (1966), C. Nakane (1967). Burling mentioned about the mode of succession to the office of a nokma who looks for a nephew, a young man from his own lineage and preferably from his own village, who will become his son-in-law and an official heir. Burling also pointed out, the lands of the nokma is identifiable in terms of his possession of title to village land (a’King). When a nokma owns such a piece of land, he is referred to as a’King nokma. The nokmas were not supposed to sell a’King land without consulting the villagers and that too never to an outsider.’
[1]
Regional officials associated with the British system, such as laskars and sordars, were not formally examined either: ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[2]
‘The loskor has several duties. He collects the house tax within his district, keeping a fixed portion of this as his own payment, and he organizes work parties to keep the roads open. His most important duty, however, is to supervise and try to settle legal disputes. The loskor sometimes appoints one or more assistants called sordars, to whom the District Council pays an annual stipend of 100 Rupees, together with a shirt and a pair of short pants. Saljing, who lived in Rengsanggri, was a sordar; but not every village had one, and a sordar does not have jurisdiction over a particular village. As a general assistant to the loskor he may assist in collecting information about a dispute, and in petty matters a sordar may sit as representative of the loskor and preside at a trial. The loskorship demands a large part of a man’s time, but a sordar spends most of his time working in his fields like his neighbors.’
[3]
The precise structure and geographical extent of Zamindar rule remains to be confirmed. The Zamindars were aristocrats from neighbouring territories attemtping to collect taxes from the local population, and therefore should not be considered bureaucrats. ’Zamindar, in India, a holder or occupier (dār) of land (zamīn). The root words are Persian, and the resulting name was widely used wherever Persian influence was spread by the Mughals or other Indian Muslim dynasties. The meanings attached to it were various. In Bengal the word denoted a hereditary tax collector who could retain 10 percent of the revenue he collected. In the late 18th century the British government made these zamindars landowners, thus creating a landed aristocracy in Bengal and Bihar that lasted until Indian independence (1947). In parts of north India (e.g., Uttar Pradesh), a zamindar denoted a large landowner with full proprietary rights. More generally in north India, zamindar denoted the cultivator of the soil or joint proprietors holding village lands in common as joint heirs. In Maratha territories the name was generally applied to all local hereditary revenue officers.’
[4]
‘There remains no record of when the Garos migrated and settled in their present habitat. Their traditional lore as recorded by Major Playfair points out that they migrated to the area from Tibet. There is evidence that the area was inhabited by the stone-using peoples-Palaeolithic and Neolithic groups-in the past. After settling in the hills, Garos initially had no close and constant contact with the inhabitants of the adjoining plains. In 1775-76 the Zamindars of Mechpara and Karaibari (at present in the Goalpara and Dhubri districts of Assam) led expeditions onto the Garo hills.’
[5]
‘In pre-British days the areas adjacent to the present habitat of the Garo were under the Zeminders of Karaibari, Kalumalupara, Habraghat, Mechpara and Sherpore. Garos of the adjoining areas had to struggle constantly with these Zeminders. Whenever the employees of the Zeminders tried to collect taxes or to oppress the Garo in some way or other, they retaliated by coming down to the plains and murdering ryots of the Zeminders. In 1775-76 the Zeminders of Mechpara and Karaibari led expeditions to the hills near about their Zeminderies and subjugated a portion of what is at present the Garo Hills district. The Zeminder of Karaibari appointed Rengtha or Pagla, a Garo as his subordinate.’
[6]
[1]: Chakrabarti, S. B., and G. Baruah 1995. “Institution Of Nokmaship In Garo Hills: Some Observations”, 76 [2]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 [3]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 245 [4]: http://www.britannica.com/topic/zamindar [5]: Roy, Sankar Kumar: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Garo [6]: Majumdar, Dhirendra Narayan 1978. “Culture Change In Two Garo Villages”, 29 |
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Village-level leaders such as headmen or elders were not subject to examination by the district executives, but chosen locally: ‘After Playfair, we get some accounts on the institution of nokma by Robbins Burling (1963), D.N. Majumdar (1966), C. Nakane (1967). Burling mentioned about the mode of succession to the office of a nokma who looks for a nephew, a young man from his own lineage and preferably from his own village, who will become his son-in-law and an official heir. Burling also pointed out, the lands of the nokma is identifiable in terms of his possession of title to village land (a’King). When a nokma owns such a piece of land, he is referred to as a’King nokma. The nokmas were not supposed to sell a’King land without consulting the villagers and that too never to an outsider. Burling also mentioned about the laskar who is selected by the nokmas. The laskar collects the house tax and tries to settle disputes within the jurisdiction of his operation following the customary rules of the community. Majumdar (1966) mentioned that about 60 laskarships were found in the whole area of his study. He mentioned that the nokmas and the sirdars were under the laskars. A’King nokma is the man who identifies the woman for inheriting the land. This land belongs to a particular clan ( machong). According to Majumdar, a nokma was also expected to report about the unnatural death to a laskar in addition to his role for deciding minor disputes within his a’King.’
[1]
Regional officials such as laskars and sordars were not formally examined either: ‘Many of the disputes of the Garos decided in their village Panchayats. When a man has some complaints against another he reports them to the Nokma or the village-head. If the nature of the complaints is simple, the Nokma in a meeting of the few leading persons of the village, decides the dispute; but if the nature of the complaints is complicated and not easy of solution the Nokma reports the matter to the Laskar. The Laskar is a very important and influential man in the Garo Hills District. The hills areas are divided into some elekas and each of such elekas is placed under a Laskar for convenient collection of the house tax as well as for deciding the disputes of small nature locally. The Laskar need not essentially be a literate man, worldly prudence is enough for the management of his eleka. In practice a Laskar wields immense influence in his eleka.’
[2]
‘The loskor has several duties. He collects the house tax within his district, keeping a fixed portion of this as his own payment, and he organizes work parties to keep the roads open. His most important duty, however, is to supervise and try to settle legal disputes. The loskor sometimes appoints one or more assistants called sordars, to whom the District Council pays an annual stipend of 100 Rupees, together with a shirt and a pair of short pants. Saljing, who lived in Rengsanggri, was a sordar; but not every village had one, and a sordar does not have jurisdiction over a particular village. As a general assistant to the loskor he may assist in collecting information about a dispute, and in petty matters a sordar may sit as representative of the loskor and preside at a trial. The loskorship demands a large part of a man’s time, but a sordar spends most of his time working in his fields like his neighbors.’
[3]
Judges employed at government courts functioned on a higher administrative level than the native village councils and were solely dependent on the colonial or independent Indian district executive. The provisions for judges and other higher-ups are unclear from the sources, but a state salary with appropriate formal examination seems most likely: ‘The judicial officers (who preside over those courts) are appointed by, or with the approval of the Governor. The rules as to administration of justice do not contain specific provisions as to their tenure and salary, or as to their full time or part time character. But most of these matters will be regulated as rules or orders issued under Rule 15 of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951. It may be of interest to note that there is a specific prohibition against a member of the Executive Committee being appointed to these courts. To this extent, their independence is protected. A legal practitioner can appear before these courts. But in cases where an accused is not arrested, the legal practitioner takes the permission of the District Council Court for such appearance.’
[4]
[1]: Chakrabarti, S. B., and G. Baruah 1995. “Institution Of Nokmaship In Garo Hills: Some Observations”, 76 [2]: Choudhury, Bhupendranath 1958. “Some Cultural And Linguistic Aspects Of The Garos”, 40 [3]: Burling, Robbins 1963. “Rengsanggri: Family And Kinship In A Garo Village”, 245 [4]: Marak, Kumie R. 1997. “Traditions And Modernity In Matrilineal Tribal Society”, 62 |
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Inferred from both continuity with preceding period and the period’s political instability and decreased centralisation.
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Inferred from both continuity with preceding period and the period’s political instability and decreased centralisation.
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Decline of the administrative system.
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Achaemenids had an examination system within their Persian bureaucracy - presumably long lost by this period?
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There were likely no bureaucrats at all in this period.
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There were likely no bureaucrats at all in this period.
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The Papacy did not use anything like the Chinese exam system for recruitment to the bureaucracy.
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Schooling was present, no formal examination system to enter service (known?).
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City-states must have had small scale administrations and were unlikely to have needed examination system to sort candidates even if such a concept existed at the time, of which we do not know.
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Peter the Great introduced the Table of Ranks in 1722, which was a formal list of positions and ranks in the military, government, and court of Imperial Russia. This system was designed to re-organize the foundations of the Russian nobility and was based on service to the Tsar rather than hereditary status. While all grades in the Table of Ranks were theoretically open by merit, and promotion required qualification for the next rank, this system was not based on a formal examination process.
Catherine the Great, who came to power in 1762, made changes to the Table of Ranks that further moved away from meritocratic principles. In 1767, she instituted automatic promotions up the 14 ranks after seven years, regardless of position or merit, thus populating the bureaucracy with time servers rather than merit-based appointees. [1] [1]: Pipes, Richard. Russia under the Old Regime. 2nd ed, Penguin Books, 1995. Zotero link: LEIXLKAP |
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There was no examination system for the Roman bureaucracy.
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There is little direct evidence for bureaucracy during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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The colonial administration initially struggled to extend its reach to the interior: ’Armed clashes and the threat of use of violence were, of course, not effective means of achieving pacification. Government, commerce and the missionaries all used gift-giving as a method of establishing some kind of modus vivendi with the local people. The missionaries were most likely to handle threatening situations by giving goods such as cloth, iron, tobacco, beads and mirrors. They lamented that their Christian message was taken by the people as secondary to their provision of medical aid and goods. The Administration also made some use of the giving of gifts as a placatory technique. MacGregor and Monckton used presents suspended on trees or left on paths to avert trouble. However, in riskier situations, government officers would not hesitate to use firearms (Cecil King 1934:13; Chignell 1911:6, 140, 226; Wetherell 1977:32, 159).’
[1]
Village constables were installed as intermediaries: ’Village Constables. The suppression by force which had marked the early contact phase gave way to a form of ‘indirect rule’ through the appointment of Village Constables. The earliest Village Constables were the strong, leading men who had confronted the Europeans as warriors. As time passed war leaders were no longer a feature of the society, but patrol reports indicate that by and large Village Constables were influential and effective in the maintenance of law and order. The position of Village Constables was an uncomfortable and interstitial one. They had the difficult task of attempting to juggle the interests of their relatives and exchange partners and of the Administration, so that both sides were reasonably happy most of the time. Between 1907 and 1914 the number of Village Constables in the Northern Division rose from fifty-four to eighty-three, indicating that this system of administration was satisfactory to the Australian authorities. The Village Constables were concerned with enforcing legislation which impinged upon many aspects of daily life: burial of the dead, upkeep of roads, construction of latrines, neatness of houses and so on. Failure to obey these regulations could lead to imprisonment.’
[2]
’Patrol reports from 1915 to the 1920s note regular satisfactory reporting by the Village Constables despite variations in the standard of housing, village cleanliness and road maintenance. Occasionally police would have to deal with disobedience against the colonial authority. In some cases the non-compliance stemmed from confusion about changed regulations but at other times the people deliberately avoided their obligations to carry for the government. In 1918 the Koropatan Village Constable enquired if carrying was still to be compulsory. He was probably confused following rumours of new legislation on carrying conditions. In 1919 and 1924 men in the area ran away when requested to carry (Bowden, 423, 6550, G91; Baker, 3995, 6548, G91; Flint, 402, 6549, G91).’
[3]
’At the time of the eruption, a certain number of new roles had already become firmly established among Papuans: member of the Royal Papuan Constabulary, Village Constable, Mission Teacher, Medical Orderly, Clerk, Labourer. Post-war government policy aimed at greatly increasing the number and scope of these roles, both by [Page 56] instituting numerous training programmes for the development of skills hitherto unknown to Papuans, and by setting up organisations in which Papuans wield a limited amount of political and administrative responsibility. It suffices, for my present purpose, to enumerate modern roles, performed by Papuans, with which the people of Sivepe came into contact during the year of my field study.’
[4]
Government Councils later replaced ad hoc administration by individual officials: ’The Government, keen now to develop a prosperous and loyal colony for defence purposes, no longer used coercion in the establishment of cash crops. They strongly encouraged such activity, but in the context of individual plots as anything co-operative or communal smacked of communism (Schwimmer 1969:86). They promoted coffee and cocoa by promising large, individual returns. The new Local Government Councils became the agencies of the Administration to promote land-tenure conversion and the planting of coffee and Malayan rubber on the individual blocks created (Waddell & Krinks 1968:15; Healey 1961:490; Jinks 1968:31, 28; Griffin, Nelson & Firth 1979:123).’
[5]
Village Constables were paid by the colonial administration: ’In response to Australian pressure, the British government annexed Papua in 1888. Gold was discovered shortly thereafter, resulting in a major movement of prospectors and miners to what was then the Northern District. Relations with the Papuans were bad from the start, and there were numerous killings on both sides. The Protectorate of British New Guinea became Australian territory by the passing of the Papua Act of 1905 by the Commonwealth Government of Australia. The new administration adopted a policy of peaceful penetration, and many measures of social and economic national development were introduced. Local control was in the hands of village constables, paid servants of the Crown. Chosen by European officers, they were intermediaries between the government and the people. In 1951 an eruption occurred on Mount Lamington, completely devastating a large part of the area occupied by the Orokaiva.’
[6]
[Constables received training from colonial authorities. As to local bureaucrats, it is not quite clear how extensively they were examined, in the early days. It may not have been a formal, standard examination with set questions but something more of an interview. This remains in need of further confirmation. The Papua Annual Reports, other reports by J.H.P. Murray (possibly a special reivew of the administration for the government in Canberra around 1920 or 1922) or his letters or biography by Francis West may provide more information on this. While there was some training, it was limited (i.e., mostly "on the job") until after WWII, when the Australian School of Pacific Adminsitration (ASOPA) was formed. An attempt that was made In the 1920s to start a formal training course in Sydney for administrative officers ("patrol officers", also called "kiaps") who were bound for Papua. How long the course continued remains in need of confirmation.] Training for constables was largely physical and based on military-style drills. Formal examination seems to have been rare for constables during this time period, although the process may have been more formalized for colonial officials: ’Some idea of the education level reached after the completion of the six months training at the depot in Papua is revealed by Corporal Garuwa’s examination paper (figure 4). Two lance-corporals vied for promotion to the rank of corporal in the Papuan Armed Constabulary in 1932. As both men had given meritorious service to the force, an examination was conducted to decide the one most eligible for the promotion. Corporal Garuwa made only one mistake and was promoted.’
[7]
We have therefore assumed no standardized examination for native officials. Kituai’s comments seem to confirm this: ’Records in the annual reports for both administrative centers for the period before World War II did not always summarize what constituted proper training for the police force, but they frequently provided statistics on recruitment and distribution after training.’
[8]
[Janice Newton (pers. comm.): On p 25 of my monograph footnote 6, I claim that the first Resident magistrates and their assistants were ‘a motley group of adventurers varying greatly in their concept of humanity and their methods..... They were trained on the job. The Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea Melbourne University Press 1972, p50 has a detailed entry on the evolution of training under ASOPA (Australian School of Pacific Administration) After the Second World War’’ Patrol Officers and Administrators were trained in Mosman Sydney, with a general orientation course followed up by academic training and refresher courses, ‘ acknowledging that expatriates needed special skills to function effectively in non -European environments.’ Jonathan Ritchie (pers. comm.): Do you think they mean the training provided to patrol officers before or after the war? If after, then of course they were trained at ASOPA. Ian Campbell has written about this, I think, in JOURNAL OF Pacific History (The ASOPA Controversy: A Pivot of Australian Policy for Papua and New Guinea, 1945-49 Journal of Pacific History 08/2010; 35(1):83-99. DOI: 10.1080/713682830.]
[1]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 30 [2]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 38 [3]: Newton, Janice 1985. “Orokaiva Production And Change”, 57 [4]: Schwimmer, Eric G. 1969. “Cultural Consequences Of A Volcanic Eruption Experienced By The Mount Lamington Orokaiva”, 55 [5]: Newton, Janice 1982. “Feasting For Oil Palm”, 66 [6]: Latham, Christopher S.: eHRAF Cultural Summary for the Orokaiva [7]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My Gun, My Brother: The World of the Papua New Guinea Colonial Police, 1920-1960", 100 [8]: Kituai, August Ibrum K. 1998. "My Gun, My Brother: The World of the Papua New Guinea Colonial Police, 1920-1960", 103 |
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No reference to examination system found.
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inapplicable
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inapplicable
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inapplicable
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Most communal matters were decided by village, tribal, and central councils, combining judicial, executive, and legislative functions. Leadership in ’civil’ affairs was largely hereditary and councils as well as lineage organization were not bureucratized in the early colonial period: ’Quite apart from this supervision by the women, however, the council suffered from another and more serious limitation. Its members obtained their position by birthright, not by military prowess or ability in other ways; and while they might declare peace or war in the name of the whole league, they could not control ambitious individuals who sought profit, revenge, or renown through sudden attacks on neighbouring peoples. Many of the so-called wars of the Iroquois seem to have been irresponsible affairs, organized and conducted without the consent and often without the knowledge of the council; for since the sachems were civil chieftains, not necessarily leaders in warfare or gifted with military talents, it was easy for a warrior who had gained a reputation for skill or valour to muster a band of hunters and start out on the warpath without notice. . . . There arose in consequence a group of warrior chiefs who attained considerable influence and sometimes rivalled the sachems themselves. It was the warrior chiefs, indeed, not the sachems, who won most fame and honour during the Revolutionary War.’
[1]
The same is true for non-hereditary leadership in warfare, which was based on personal merit, but not subject to formal examination: ’The powers and duties of the sachems and chiefs were entirely of a civil character, and confined, by their organic laws, to the affairs of peace. No sachem could go out to war in his official capacity, as a civil ruler. If disposed to take the war-path, he laid aside his civil office, for the time being, and became a common warrior. It becomes an important inquiry, therefore, to ascertain in whom the military power, was vested. The Iroquois had no distinct class of war-chiefs, raised up and set apart to command in time of war; neither do the sachems or chiefs appear to have possessed the power of appointing such persons as they considered suitable to the post of command. All military operations were left entirely to private enterprise, and to the system of voluntary service, the sachems seeking rather to repress and restrain, than to encourage the martial ardor of the people. Their principal war-captains were to be found among he class called chiefs, many of whom were elected to this office in reward for their military achievements. The singular method of warfare among the Iroquois renders it extremely difficult to obtain a complete and satisfactory explanation of the manner in which their varlike operations were conducted. Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in the hands of any single individual, but inclined to the opposite principle of division among a number of equals; and this policy they carried into their military as well as through their civil organization. Small bands were, in the first instance, organized by individual leaders, each of which, if they were afterwards united upon the same enterprise, continued under its own captain, and the whole force, as well as the conduct of the expedition, was under their joint management. They appointed no one of their number to absolute command, but the general direction was left open to the strongest will, or the most persuasive voice.’
[2]
[1]: Speck, Frank Gouldsmith 1945. “Iroquois: A Study In Cultural Evolution", 31 [2]: Morgan, Lewis Henry, and Herbert M. Lloyd 1901. “League Of The Ho-De’-No-Sau-Nee Or Iroquois. Vol. I”, 67 |
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inferred from discussion of sources of development/introduction in later periods
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no known writing system.
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Not mentioned in sources.
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Professions were hereditary
[1]
[1]: http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/sites/silkroad/files/knowledge-bank-article/vol_II%20silk%20road_cities%20and%20urban%20life%20in%20the%20kushan%20kingdom.pdf pp. 301-302 |
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Crude examination system already existed in the Western Han.
[1]
However, "Before A.D. 132 the hsiao-lien did not have to undergo a written examination. It was decreed in that year that all must be examined..."
[2]
Also, "Before the Northern Sung, the principal means of entry into the social and political elite was by official recommendation or kinship relations."
[3]
[1]: (Zhao 2015, 68) Zhao, Dingxin in Scheidel, Walter. ed. 2015. State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. [2]: (Bielenstein 1986, 516) [3]: (Elmam 2000, 5) Elman, B. 2000. A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. |
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’the examination-based meritocracy of China’s bureaucratic world was not too palatable to the Japanese. This is ironic in view of the prominence of examinations in present-day Japan, but understandable from the perspective of an established elite wishing to safeguard control and stability.’
[1]
’ ’bore the honorary title of shinshi, which, strictly speaking, was supposed to be awarded to those who had passed the civil service examination modeled on China’s chin shih civil service examination but lacking the prestige of the original and hence rarely taken.’
[2]
[1]: Henshall, Kenneth .2012. A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. [Third Edition]p.25 [2]: Henshall, Kenneth .2012. A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. [Third Edition]p.370 |
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The earliest evidence for a “bureaucratic machinery” dates to the late fifth century CE.
[1]
[1]: (Steenstrup 1996: 11) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7YDV5KGG |
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Many positions appear to have been hereditary. ’In this country there are ministers, generals, astronomers, and other officials, and, below them, all kinds of minor employees; only their names differ from ours. Mostly princes are designated for [official] positions; in other cases those selected offer their daughters as royal concubine.’
[1]
’Administrative officials were classified in four divisions, apparently horizontally arranged, which may have had a geographical basis, but about which little is known (Sahai 1978: 18). At least some administrative posts were hereditary, especially in the Angkorian period. For example, the purohita and the yājaka usually seem to have been hereditary officials and a single family was said to have been in charge of the devarāja cult for a period of 250 years (ibid., 24-25). A number of positions close to the kings (purohita, hotar, guru, ācārya and guṇadośadarśi) are referred to in Angkorian period inscriptions written by officials. These tend to be Sanskrit terms which had religious connotations, but as Vickery (2002: 93) points out, some of these became secular, as in India, and perhaps were so in Cambodia from the start. Researchers are not in agreement on issues such as whether certain roles and titles had to be held by Brahmins, could be held by women or were hereditary (Mabbett 1978: 33; Sahai 1978: 28; Chakravarti 1980: 53).’
[2]
[1]: (Zhou and Smithies 2001, p. 27) [2]: (Lustig 2009, p. 74) |
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Zhu experimented with the exam system. "The first civil service exams were held at the lowest level (of three) in 1371. They were suspended two years later by a disgusted emperor, who found the graduates literary but impractical. Further recruitment by recommendations stressed virtue over book learning, but the exams were revived again in 1384 and remained in place from then on."
[1]
[1]: (Lorge 2005, 109) |
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"Distrustful of their own military peers, they revised the old T’ang examination system and used it to recruit shih ta-fu ("literally servicemen and grand masters"), essentially a new civil service, from among the emergent commoners and nouveau riche."
[1]
"... the Sung examination system graduated on average about 200 chin-shih per year, and these graduates soon made up about 40 percent of “administrative-class” officials." [2] In the army "Training and drill were studied scientifically, and in the best units, at least, men were allocated to different duties on the basis of examinations in shooting and various athletic pursuits." [3] [1]: (Hartman 2015, 20) [2]: (Hartman 2015, 34) [3]: (Peers 2002, 34) |
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There are no indications to an examination system in the references reviewed by the RA, but Vickery points out that an important family of Adhyapura provided ministers to five kings, which suggests that the appointment of ministers may not have followed an examination system.
[1]
[1]: (Vickery 1986, 96) |
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"The examination system was initiated in a partial form during the Han but had been in abeyance during practically all of the Period of Division. Under the Sui and T’ang it was taken up again and developed still further, reaching its full scope by the 8th century and becoming an important, although not the major, form for the recruiting of officials to the government bureaucracy. It should be noted, however, that the descendants of high officials had the right of entry into the register of officials without taking examinations."
[1]
The examination system became more widespread during the Tang dynasty [2] Although, it was still somewhat limited in its use due to the aristocratic society of this period. [3] [1]: (Rodzinski 1979, 119) [2]: (Bol, Peter. North China Workshop 2016) [3]: (Mostern, Ruth. Personal Communication to Jill Levine, Dan Hoyer, and Peter Turchin. April 2020. Email) |
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"The examination system was initiated in a partial form during the Han but had been in abeyance during practically all of the Period of Division. Under the Sui and T’ang it was taken up again and developed still further, reaching its full scope by the 8th century and becoming an important, although not the major, form for the recruiting of officials to the government bureaucracy. It should be noted, however, that the descendants of high officials had the right of entry into the register of officials without taking examinations."
[1]
The examination system became more widespread during the Tang dynasty [2] Although, it was still somewhat limited in its use due to the aristocratic society of this period. [3] [1]: (Rodzinski 1979, 119) [2]: (Bol, Peter. North China Workshop 2016) [3]: (Mostern, Ruth. Personal Communication to Jill Levine, Dan Hoyer, and Peter Turchin. April 2020. Email) |
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"The old characteristic of the sukkal-mah is not attested anymore, or at least is not as visible. However, it is still possible to see a system in which the ruling king (residing in Susa) was surrounded by a series of high functionaries. These were all more or less his relatives, ruled over regions and cities, and were involved in the succession to the throne."
[1]
[1]: (Leverani 2014, 529) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East. History, society and economy. Routledge. London. |
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The behaviors described by Gjerset seem to suggest an absence of formal training and promotion among royal officials: ’Still more offensive than the restrictions on trade was the new method of collecting revenues, introduced by the government. The taxes were farmed out to the hirdstjórar, or governors of Iceland, for a certain sum to be paid by them to the royal treasury. Little did the kings care how the people might be oppressed by the tax gatherers, or what sums were collected, so long as they received the stipulated amount. This system was first established in 1354. [...] In 1357 the annals state that one hirdstjóri was placed over each quarter, and that these for officials had leased all Iceland for three years with taxes and incomes.’
[1]
’Church and state officials vied with each other to collect taxes and dues from the impoverished and suffering people. Goaded to the utmost, the boendur would sometimes offer so violent a resistance to their oppressors, that scenes of conflict between the tyrannical officials and the angry people became favorite themes with poets and annalists.’
[2]
Due to his strong nationalist bias, his comments should be taken with a grain of salt; but they seem to fit in with the information provided above.
[1]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 247 [2]: Gjerset, Knut [1924]. "History of Iceland", 248 |
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|
Yuan rarely held imperial examination but adopted heredity and recommendation as the major recruit sources. Only 16 imperial examinations were held during Yuan.
|
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|
[1]
[1]: (Chamberlain 1998, 234-35) Chamberlain, Michael. 1998. “The Crusader Era and the Ayyūbid Dynasty.” In The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640-1517, edited by Carl F. Petry, 211-41. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/XQVWZ4VA. |
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Mamluk slaves trained and likely tested and advanced on merit but career depended on master achieving office or being agreeable to the reigning Sultan. No centralized examination system for the government.
|
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|
Promotion in the aristocracy seemed to be through military service or inheritance.
[1]
[1]: (Payne 1973, 271) Payne, Stanley G. 1973. A History of Spain and Portugal, Volume 1. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. http://libro.uca.edu/payne1/spainport1.htm. https://www.zotero.org/groups/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/6MIH95XP |
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There are no indications to an examination system in the references reviewed by the RA, but Vickery points out that an important family of Adhyapura provided ministers to five kings, which suggests that the appointment of ministers may not have followed an examination system.
[1]
[1]: (Vickery 1986, p. 96) |
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|
No bureaucracy. The chief of the village "worked to maintain peace and was the authority in regard to all matters legal or moral, including land ownership, religion, and ceremonies."
[1]
[1]: (Keil 2012, 108) Sarah Keil. Bambara. Andrea L Stanton. ed. 2012. Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa: An Encyclopedia. Sage. Los Angeles. |
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|
In the Carolingian era, the lands under Frankish control grew considerably and an administrative system was developed in order to govern this large territory.
[1]
One official position that first appeared in this period was the missus dominicus (king’s representative), who could be sent out from the court to inspect the counties and pass on the king’s decrees.
[2]
However, it is not clear how this or other administrative positions were obtained.
[1]: (Chazelle 1995, 329-30) Chazelle, Celia. 1995. “Carolingian Dynasty.” In Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, edited by William W. Kibler, Grover A. Zinn, Lawrence Earp, and John Bell Henneman, Jr., 328-34. New York: Garland Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/F3ZBDZSD. [2]: (Chazelle 1995, 330) Chazelle, Celia. 1995. “Carolingian Dynasty.” In Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, edited by William W. Kibler, Grover A. Zinn, Lawrence Earp, and John Bell Henneman, Jr., 328-34. New York: Garland Publishing. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/F3ZBDZSD. |
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|
Initially, office holders were appointed directly by the king, but hereditary office holding become common, in some areas attached to the land grants awarded with the office.
[1]
[1]: Gupta, Dipankar. "From Varna to Jati: The Indian caste system, from the Asiatic to the feudal mode of production." Journal of Contemporary Asia 10, no. 3 (1980 ) p.260. |
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|
Inferred continuity with preceding period: "the transmission of one’s professional knowledge from father to son was not a particularly negative tendency for the palace. In the long run, however, it transformed the palace and temple personnel into a series of closed corporations. In other words, members of these elite groups prevented anyone outside this clique from accessing their posts. They also monopolised the technical knowledge needed for the management of these institutions."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 196) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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|
Inferred continuity with preceding period: "the transmission of one’s professional knowledge from father to son was not a particularly negative tendency for the palace. In the long run, however, it transformed the palace and temple personnel into a series of closed corporations. In other words, members of these elite groups prevented anyone outside this clique from accessing their posts. They also monopolised the technical knowledge needed for the management of these institutions."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 196) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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|
"the transmission of one’s professional knowledge from father to son was not a particularly negative tendency for the palace. In the long run, however, it transformed the palace and temple personnel into a series of closed corporations. In other words, members of these elite groups prevented anyone outside this clique from accessing their posts. They also monopolised the technical knowledge needed for the management of these institutions."
[1]
[1]: (Liverani 2014, 196) Liverani, Mario. Tabatabai, Soraia trans. 2014. The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London: Routledge. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/itemKey/7DRZQS5Q/q/liverani. |
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|
"Simultaneously with and probably in response to this development, the central bureaucratic apparatus staffed by Iranian urban notables, many of whom had served the Qaraquyunlu Turkmens and the Timurids before the Aqquyunlu conquests, also underwent tremendous expansion and elaboration. Representatives of such important local Iranian families as the Kujuji of Azarbayjan, the Savaji of Persian Iraq, the Sa’idi of Persian Iraq and Fars, the Daylami of Persian Iraq and Gilan, and the Bayhaqi of Khurasan were appointed to supervise the administrative, fiscal, and religious affairs of the government. There is also evidence of an attempt to standardize and regularize the administrative and financial procedures in this period."
[1]
Implies that administrative positions were given to members of elite families.
[1]: (Woods 1998, 108) |
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|
Appointments were made by the Khan, it was not a meritocratic service.
[1]
[1]: Morgan, David. The Mongols. 2nd ed. The Peoples of Europe. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, pp.142-143; Ann K. S. Lambton, ’ECONOMY v. FROM THE ARAB CONQUEST TO THE END OF THE IL-KHANIDS’ (part 2) http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/economy-5-part2 |
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|
Sieroszewski reports corruption and exploitation of the Sakha population by administrators: ’The government undertook to regulate the distribution of Yakut land, [Page 764] partly to cease the disorders which arose as a result of this a nd partly to as sure and regulate the taking of yassak, which was being gathered with unbelievable arbitrariness and accompanied by terrible ill use, was stolen, substituted for, and hidden, and they stole from the Great Tsars by putting far too little in the treasury and by undervaluing the yassak greatly, and they impoverished the yassak-paying people and robbed the taxes and injured them.’
[1]
This suggests that Czarist control of local administrators was not tight enough to allow for systematic examination and merit promotion on a more than de iure basis.
[1]: Sieroszewski, Wacław 1993. “Yakut: An Experiment In Ethnographic Research", 763 |
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|
"Succession was typically hereditary for all administrative positions, although the shah could always break the line."
[1]
[1]: Rudi Matthee ‘SAFAVID DYNASTY’ http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/safavids. |
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|
There was no examination system.
|
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|
There was no examination system.
|
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|
No mention in sources: offices held through election or promotion.
[1]
[1]: (Viggiano 2013: 67) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/3TCVQMYV |
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|
No mention in sources: offices held through election or promotion.
[1]
[1]: (Viggiano 2013: 67) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/3TCVQMYV |
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|
the professional bureaucrats of the Muromachi period were hereditary administrators
[1]
‘There was no examination system as in China; rather, the positions were hereditary, limited to the same small group of families.’
[2]
[1]: Yamamura, Kozo (ed). 2008. The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 3. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press [sixth edition].p.216 [2]: Mass, Jeffrey P., and William B. Hauser (eds). 1985.The Bakufu in Japanese History. Stanford University Press.p.60 |
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|
I have found no evidence of an examination system in the Kamakura period and as bureaucratic posts tended to be granted on a hereditary basis its existence at this time is not likely, there is also a source stating the absence of an examination system in the following Muromachi period.
[1]
[1]: Mass, Jeffrey P., and William B. Hauser (eds). 1985.The Bakufu in Japanese History. Stanford University Press.p.60 |
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’While examinations in China theoretically gave everyone a chance to rise in society, in Japan the university was virtually closed to all but the sons of courtiers. This was because a young man had to hold court rank before he could be appointed to an official post. In effect, all but the very dullest aristocratic sons were assured of bureaucratic office without having to make an effort at the university, though promotion within the bureaucracy depended on diligence and scholarly attainmentsin most cases.
[1]
’the examination-based meritocracy of China’s bureaucratic world was not too palatable to the Japanese. This is ironic in view of the prominence of examinations in present-day Japan, but understandable from the perspective of an established elite wishing to safeguard control and stability.’
[2]
[1]: Mason, Richard Henry Pitt. 1997. A History of Japan: Revised Edition. Tuttle Publishing.p.57 [2]: Henshall, Kenneth .2012. A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower. Palgrave Macmillan. New York. [Third Edition]p.25 |
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|
‘part of the importance of the Shoheiko [a government training school who’s origins date back to 1630] was that it trained students to pass exams that enabled them to assume government positions.’
[1]
[1]: Deal, William E. 2005. Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan. Oxford University Press.p.229. |
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|
this was the code for the Samanid bureaucracy.
|
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|
there are no references to examination systems in the reviewed literature.
|
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|
"In contrast to other medieval societies, the Chinese civilization has distinguished by the high vertical mobility. It was related to the existence in China of the system of tests of positions. This system was adopted by Kitans and, since 988, introduced in Liao. According to the rules established, the examinations were conducted in the volosts, regions and administration of Stationary Office every three years. Those who passed examinations in volosts were called hsiang-chien, in the region - fu-chieh and in the administration of Stationary Office - chiti (LS 12: 4a; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 454-455, 491)."
[1]
[1]: (Kradin 2014, 157-158) |
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|
Not enough data, though it seems reasonable to infer absence.
|
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|
Family connections used to obtain positions. "The Kalmyk and Zünghar confederations were similar in many ways. Both were divided into tribes (AIMAG), which themselves were conglomerations of exogamous yasun (bones, or patrilineages). The khan or khung-taiji was assisted by an office (yamu) or court (zarghu) composed of four chief officials, variously called ministers (tüshimed), judges (zarghuchis; see JARGHUCHI), or zaisangs (from Chinese zaixiang, grand councillor). These were commoner retainers of the ruler’s tribe. The Zünghar ruler GALDAN-TSEREN (r. 1727-45) expanded the council by adding six zarghuchis to assist the four tüshimed.The people were assigned to appanages (ulus or anggi) controlled by a nobility (noyod or taiji; see NOYAN) of the tribes’ particular ruling “bones.” Below the noyods were the tabunangs, or sons-in-law or those who had married women of the noyod lineages. The positions of “four ministers,” or “judges,” were restricted to such tabunangs of the ruler. Below them were minor functionaries: standard bearers, trumpeters, aides-de-camp (kiya), and so on."
[1]
[1]: (Atwood 2004, 421) |
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|
Sources do not suggest there is evidence for full-time bureaucracy during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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|
The monumental construction at Monte Alban has been seen as a sign of a high degree of administrative centralization.
[1]
However, we lack adequate information about administrative structures at Monte Albán to be able to discern whether full-time specialist bureaucrats (i.e. not just chiefs or generals with administrative duties) were present.
[2]
[3]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. [2]: Gary Feinman, pers. comm., January 2018. [3]: Charles Spencer, pers. comm., January 2018. |
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|
The monumental construction at Monte Alban has been seen as a sign of a high degree of administrative centralization.
[1]
However, we lack adequate information about administrative structures at Monte Albán to be able to discern whether full-time specialist bureaucrats (i.e. not just chiefs or generals with administrative duties) were present.
[2]
[3]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. [2]: Gary Feinman, pers. comm., January 2018. [3]: Charles Spencer, pers. comm., January 2018. |
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|
The monumental construction at Monte Alban has been seen as a sign of a high degree of administrative centralization.
[1]
However, we lack adequate information about administrative structures at Monte Albán to be able to discern whether full-time specialist bureaucrats (i.e. not just chiefs or generals with administrative duties) were present.
[2]
[3]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. [2]: Gary Feinman, pers. comm., January 2018. [3]: Charles Spencer, pers. comm., January 2018. |
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|
Sources do not suggest there is evidence for full-time bureaucrats during this period.
[1]
[1]: Marcus and Flannery (1996) Zapotec Civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley. Flannery and Marcus (1983) The Cloud People: divergent evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec civilizations. Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Academic Press, New York. |
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|
No writing, and small size of polity enable us to infer that there was no examination system. sources do not suggest there is evidence for an examination system during this period, although status may have been gained by achievement throughout an individual’s lifetime.
[1]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London, p88 |
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|
No writing, and small size of polity enable us to infer that there was no examination system. sources do not suggest there is evidence for an examination system during this period, although status may have been gained by achievement throughout an individual’s lifetime.
[1]
[1]: Marcus, J. and K. V. Flannery (1996). Zapotec civilization: How urban society evolved in Mexico’s Oaxaca Valley, Thames and Hudson London, p88 |
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|
No evidence has been found of state organisation at Mehrgarh.
[1]
[2]
An urban community of thousands suggests Mehrgarh likely had some degree of hierarchy for dispute resolution, perhaps a chief or collective decision making body but there is no evidence for any institutions of government.
[1]: Gregory L. Possehl. The Indus Civilization. A Contemporary Perspective. Walnut Creek, Altamira, 2002, p. 6 [2]: Petrie, C. A. (in press) Chapter 11, Case Study: Mehrgarh. In, Barker, G and Goucher, C (eds.) Cambridge World History, Volume 2: A World with Agriculture, 12,000 BCE - 500 CE. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge |
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|
Archaeological evidence, mostly in the form of seals, suggests the existence of some kind of bureaucratic system through Pirak II and III, of one or two levels at least
[1]
. Neither archaeology nor written documents shed light on this particular variable.
[1]: Ceccarelli, pers. comm. to E. Cioni, Feb 2017) |
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|
Thai bureaucracy was extensively reformed between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century
[1]
. It seems reasonable to infer that, before the reforms, Rattanakosin bureaucracy resembled Ayutthayan bureaucracy. Specifically, "[e]ntry into the official ranks was a noble preserve. Families presented their sons at court, where they were enrolled as pages. Ascent up the ladder of success then depended on personal skill, family connections, and royal favour"
[2]
.
[1]: (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009, p. 96) [2]: (Baker and Phongpaichit 2009, p. 15) |
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|
There is no state-sponsored examination system as in China from the Tang or Song-period onwards.
[1]
However (private) professional training was available which might have involved exams. "The allocation of chairs showed that the university as it existed in the first half of the fifth century, had sunk to the level of an institution for professional training. The universal nature of a real university had been lost since the days of the Alexandrines. Here young men now received the education necessary to equip them for the higher offices in the civil service." [2] [1]: (Johannes Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences. Personal Communication [2]: (Haussig 1971, 81) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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|
There is no state-sponsored examination system as in China from the Tang or Song-period onwards.
[1]
However (private) professional training was available which might have involved exams. "The allocation of chairs showed that the university as it existed in the first half of the fifth century, had sunk to the level of an institution for professional training. The universal nature of a real university had been lost since the days of the Alexandrines. Here young men now received the education necessary to equip them for the higher offices in the civil service." [2] [1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences. Personal Communication. [2]: (Haussig 1971, 81) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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|
"Attempts towards such a system in 11th century, but still not as permanent or sophisticated as in China.".
[1]
"The allocation of chairs showed that the university as it existed in the first half of the fifth century, had sunk to the level of an institution for professional training. The universal nature of a real university had been lost since the days of the Alexandrines. Here young men now received the education necessary to equip them for the higher offices in the civil service."
[2]
[1]: (Preiser-Kapeller 2015) Institute for Medieval Research, Division of Byzantine Research, Austrian Academy of Sciences. Personal Communication. [2]: (Haussig 1971, 81) Haussig, H W. trans Hussey, J M. 1971. History of Byzantine Civilization. Thames and Hudson. |
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|
"Appointments to judgeships required the attainment of appropriate levels in the educational system."
[1]
"The iç oğlani were trained forup to seven years in palace schools which concentrated on character-building, leadership, military and athletic prowess, languages, religion, science, and a creative art of the pupil’s choosing. Three further examinations selected men for the Kapikulu cavalry, to be Kapikulu officers and, at the top of the tree, to become military or administrative leaders. All remained bachelors until their training ended, when most married women who had been through a parallel schooling in the Palace harem." [2] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) |
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|
"Appointments to judgeships required the attainment of appropriate levels in the educational system."
[1]
"The iç oğlani were trained forup to seven years in palace schools which concentrated on character-building, leadership, military and athletic prowess, languages, religion, science, and a creative art of the pupil’s choosing. Three further examinations selected men for the Kapikulu cavalry, to be Kapikulu officers and, at the top of the tree, to become military or administrative leaders. All remained bachelors until their training ended, when most married women who had been through a parallel schooling in the Palace harem." [2] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) |
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|
1 year study and examination. Pass examination to become eligible for position in government.
[1]
Crude examination system. [2] "Before the Northern Sung, the principal means of entry into the social and political elite was by official recommendation or kinship relations." [3] [1]: (Roberts 2003, 50) [2]: (Zhao 2015, 68) Zhao, Dingxin in Scheidel, Walter. ed. 2015. State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. [3]: (Elmam 2000, 5) Elman, B. 2000. A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. |
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|
"Appointments to judgeships required the attainment of appropriate levels in the educational system."
[1]
"The iç oğlani were trained forup to seven years in palace schools which concentrated on character-building, leadership, military and athletic prowess, languages, religion, science, and a creative art of the pupil’s choosing. Three further examinations selected men for the Kapikulu cavalry, to be Kapikulu officers and, at the top of the tree, to become military or administrative leaders. All remained bachelors until their training ended, when most married women who had been through a parallel schooling in the Palace harem." [2] [1]: (Lapidus 2012, 440) [2]: (Nicolle 1983, 10) |
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|
The system was not meritocratic. Senior position often became hereditary. All positions were ultimately the appointed of the Sultan or the regional officials.
[1]
[1]: Andrew Peacock SALJUQS iii. SALJUQS OF RUM’ http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/saljuqs-iii |
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|
"The most effective of these were talented local men who rose through the ranks."
[1]
Not present for the Abbsaids on which the bureaucratic system was based.
[1]: (Starr 2013) Starr, S. Frederick. 2013. Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane. Princeton University Press. Princeton. |
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|
-
|
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|
Full-time specialists most likely absent, their duties being fulfilled by the chiefs and other social leaders of communities within the social hierarchy, if Great Zimbabwe was organized along the same lines as the Karanga, as Chirikure suggests. “Great Zimbabwe is a ruined Shona city or guta which controlled a sizeable territory…. As a collection of homesteads and misha, the guta had no formalised bureaucracy, no formalised division of labour or occupational specialisations… // …In general [in Karanga society], imba…, was the smallest and lowest level social unit. A collection of dzimba formed misha…. A group of misha formed dunhu…. A group of matunhu formed a state (nyika) under a chief (ishe/mambo/changamire)…. Each level performed administrative, economic, religious, and political roles consistent with rank.”
[1]
.
[1]: (Chirikure 2021, 258-267) Shadreck Chirikure, Great Zimbabwe: Reclaiming a ‘Confiscated’ Past (Routledge, 2021). Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/MWWKAGSJ/collection |
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|
"The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux, although the colonial era saw the formation of a council of chiefs (Eishengyero) claiming traditional status. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance. In fact, the only governmental business conducted at court was the hearing of cases, often involving the disputed possession of cattle or women by the Hima. The appointment and dismissal of military and administrative functionaries from among those aristocratic Hima and Hinda princes who regularly attended court was the Mugabe’s sole administrative function."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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|
The following directly applies to northern Sierra Leone, but, based on Fyle and Foray’s assertion that "[p]olitical systems in the Sierra Leone area were fairly similar in structure,"
[1]
it seems reasonable to infer that it can be applied to the whole of Sierra Leone’s interior. "The precolonial sociopolitical organization of northern Sierra Leone is difficult to characterize, in part because of the limited information available prior to the late nineteenth century. [...] Features of centralized political authority (e.g., Cohen 1991; Southhall 1988, 1991), such as institutionalized bureaucracy, taxation, centralized redistribution of goods and labor, stratified accumulation of wealth, and military control, that have been traditionally seen as markers of state-level organization were limited."
[2]
[1]: (Fyle and Foray 2006: xxx) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM. [2]: (DeCorse 2012: 285) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/7FGSKCDI/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that even when this polity grew in complexity following the reforms of the 18th century, it still lacked a bureaucracy: "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux, although the colonial era saw the formation of a council of chiefs (Eishengyero) claiming traditional status. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance. In fact, the only governmental business conducted at court was the hearing of cases, often involving the disputed possession of cattle or women by the Hima. The appointment and dismissal of military and administrative functionaries from among those aristocratic Hima and Hinda princes who regularly attended court was the Mugabe’s sole administrative function."
[1]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. |
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|
Absence of full-time specialised bureaucracy (which would have likely required some form of examination system) inferred nferred from the fact that the king seemed to struggle to maintain control over provinces, and left them either in the hands of close relatives, or those of local chiefs: "Though Ntare Rugamba is said to have doubled the area of the country, the administrative legacy of Ntare’s rule was at least as important history to Burundi political history as were his military exploits. With such rapid expansion, Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four- tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). (See Figure 8.) From this pattern, three types of political relations emerged. Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi. [...] In the northwest, by contrast, pretenders to royal power had more tenuous claims to Ganwa identity; they drew on local traditions of resistance and benefited from the resources of the Lake Tanganyika trade network (as well as support from other states such as the Shi kingdoms west of Lake Kivu)."
[1]
Note, too, that bureaucracy did not clearly emerge in neighbouring, culturally related polities. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[2]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[3]
Indeed, no information could be found on the existence of full-time specialised bureaucracy in the Ugandan kingdoms of Buganda and Bunyoro, both particularly well studied.
[1]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. [2]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [3]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
"No text makes it possible for us to make a direct connection between the presence of a strong merchant class and the Sogdian political structure. While it cannot be proven, the hypothesis of this connection is nonetheless very tempting. Indeed, the summit of Sogdian society was occupied by an oligarchy whose exact social nature we must struggle to discern. One can suppose that it was formed by the union of the families of noble dihqans, with their possessions in the countryside, and the merchant families. At Bukhara, in any case, when the Arabs had seized the city, the merchant family of Kashkathan was at the head of the resistance to Islamization. Likewise, at Paykent, the “city of merchants” par excellence in the Arabic sources, no sovereign is ever named and the merchants seem to have acted collectively. The community (naf ) of Turfan is cited together with the Chinese king of Gaochang/Turfan."
[1]
[1]: (De la Vaissière 2005, 168-169) |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
Moreover, it is curious that, despite the wealth of literature available on this polity, so far we have been unable to find mentions of a bureaucracy, which strongly suggests (without outright confirming) that it was simply not present at this time.
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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"Ubaydullah Khan sought to make some departure from the established conventions: rather than confine his choice to members of the distinguished, old-fashioned nobility, he began to recruit to his service the sons of craftsmen and merchants; as his contemporary Mir Muhammad Amin Bukhari noted in his Ubaydullah-nama [The History of Ubaydullah], people ‘of humble origin’ were promoted by him. ‘The son of a slave was made a court official,’ grumbles the indignant historian. Ubaydullah Khan offered ’the little man the places of great men’, made him ‘a ruler of state, a leading emir, and the ornament of the military caste, thereby deviating from the course of previous rulers and from the decisions and habits of his forefathers.’"
[1]
Even when promotion is not limited to nobles, no examination system is mentioned.
[1]: (Mukminova 2003, 51) |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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|
Inferred from the fact that full-time specialised bureaucracy does not seem to have emerged in the broader Great Lakes region prior to the colonial era. For example, in Nkore, "The royal court served as a judicial and political center, but not as a bureaucratic focal point. The Mugabe’s chief minister, the Enganzi, was not a prime minister in the usual sense of leader of government business. He was merely the King’s favorite. Neither was there a cabinet nor governmental bureaux [...]. No distinction between the royal and state treasury was made and the heads of local administrative units were not required to attend court or reside at the capital as in Buganda, for instance."
[1]
In Rwanda: "In this sort of government, administration was not yet institutionalized."
[2]
In Burundi, the king seemingly entrusted administration mostly to close relatives and local chiefs: "Ntare relied on his sons as administrators: he was strong enough to set up his sons, but not strong enough to incorporate these regions fully within central control. [...] During the late nineteenth century, under the reign of Mwezi Gisabo, a four-tiered system of administration emerged: a central area around Muramvya under the control of the king; an area under the administration of his sons or brothers most closely allied to the king; a broad swath further east and south administered by Batare chiefs, the descendants of Ntare; and another zone, covering the western and northwestern areas of the country, under the administration of others, not Baganwa (in fact, they were mostly Hutu authorities). [...] Administrative authorities in the east and south- east, often Batare (descendants of Ntare Rugamba), simply retained their administrative autonomy while acknowledging nominal central court ritual hegemony. Those in the northeast more characteristically undertook open revolt, often by those who sought to overthrow Mwezi."
[3]
[1]: (Steinhart 1978: 144) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/D3FV7SKV/collection. [2]: (Vansina 2004: 63) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/5J4MRHUB/collection. [3]: (Newbury 2001: 283-284) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/J5A6DM3P/collection. |
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levels. "We emphasise from the beginning that our historical knowledge of kings and the length of their reigns, and of the political structure and organisation of Kaabu remains very limited."
[1]
[1]: (Giesing and Vydrine 2007: 4, quoted in Green 2009: 92) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/collections/GWWIKDDM/items/V2GTBN8A/collection. |
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"Contexts that could shed light on the dynamics of social structure and hierarchies in the metropolis, such as the royal burial site of Oyo monarchs and the residences of the elite population, have not been investigated. The mapping of the palace structures has not been followed by systematic excavations (Soper, 1992); and questions of the economy, military system, and ideology of the empire have not been addressed archaeologically, although their general patterns are known from historical studies (e.g, Johnson, 1921; Law, 1977)."
[1]
Regarding this period, however, one of the historical studies mentioned in this quote also notes: "Of the earliestperiod of Oyo history, before the sixteenth century, very little is known."
[2]
Law does not then go on to provide specific information directly relevant to this variable.
[1]: (Ogundiran 2005: 151-152) [2]: (Law 1977: 33) |
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The Achaemenids had an examination system
[1]
which they might have inherited. However, a couple hundred years had now passed since the conquest of the Achaemenids by the Greeks and throughout this period there was a decrease in the level of bureaucratic sophistication so by this time we could infer absent.
[1]: (Farazmand 2001, 56) Farazmand, Ali in Farazmand, Ali ed. 2001. Handbook of Comparative and Development Public Administration. CRC Press. |
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Crude examination system already existed in the Western Han.
[1]
However, "Before A.D. 132 the hsiao-lien did not have to undergo a written examination. It was decreed in that year that all must be examined..."
[2]
Also, "Before the Northern Sung, the principal means of entry into the social and political elite was by official recommendation or kinship relations."
[3]
[1]: (Zhao 2015, 68) Zhao, Dingxin in Scheidel, Walter. ed. 2015. State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. [2]: (Bielenstein 1986, 516) [3]: (Elmam 2000, 5) Elman, B. 2000. A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. |
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|
The bureaucracy may have had some examination procedure as first Chinese examination system was developed under the earlier Western Han dynasty. However, "Before the Northern Sung, the principal means of entry into the social and political elite was by official recommendation or kinship relations."
[1]
Crude examination system existed in the Western Han [2] and had been developed further by 132 CE "Before A.D. 132 the hsiao-lien did not have to undergo a written examination. It was decreed in that year that all must be examined..." [3] [1]: (Elmam 2000, 5) Elman, B. 2000. A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. [2]: (Zhao 2015, 68) Zhao, Dingxin in Scheidel, Walter. ed. 2015. State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. [3]: (Bielenstein 1986, 516) |
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"The examination system was initiated in a partial form during the Han but had been in abeyance during practically all of the Period of Division. Under the Sui and T’ang it was taken up again and developed still further, reaching its full scope by the 8th century and becoming an important, although not the major, form for the recruiting of officials to the government bureaucracy. It should be noted, however, that the descendants of high officials had the right of entry into the register of officials without taking examinations."
[1]
"The first mention of a degree and of a written examination is, I believe, for 595 when the examination of candidates for the hsiu-ts’ai degree is mentioned. Miyazaki believes that this was the name of the examination and of the degree given to the candidates sent up annually from the provinces. ... Two other examinations were also administered by the central government, the ming-ching and the chin-shih, to candidates who presented themselves. The hsiu-ts’ai apparently required broad general learning, the ming-ching tested the candidates’ mastery of a specific classical work, while the chin-shih was primarily a test of literary ability." [2] [1]: (Rodzinski 1979, 119) [2]: (Wright 1979, 86) |
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|
1 year study and examination. Pass examination to become eligible for position in government.
[1]
Crude examination system. [2] "Before the Northern Sung, the principal means of entry into the social and political elite was by official recommendation or kinship relations." [3] [1]: (Roberts 2003, 50) [2]: (Zhao 2015, 68) Zhao, Dingxin in Scheidel, Walter. ed. 2015. State Power in Ancient China and Rome. Oxford University Press. [3]: (Elmam 2000, 5) Elman, B. 2000. A cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China. Berkeley: University of California Press. |
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ineage generally. The latter was executive chief, or "chief of talk," and the former symbolic chief, or "chief of food." Food presentations were made to the symbolic chief. Sometimes the symbolic and executive functions fell to the same individual; often they did not. The symbolic chief was surrounded by his lineage brothers and by his sons, who acted as his agents. These followers and his sisters and daughters were of chiefly rank, distinct from commoners. Through conquest, a lineage might gain the chiefship in more than one district and establish a junior branch as the chiefly lineage in the conquered district. The now subordinate district rendered food presentations to the superordinate one. Most districts were linked in two rival leagues based on competing schools of magic and ritual relating to war, politics, and rhetoric. A chief’s authority derived from two things. His lineage’s ownership of the district’s space entitled him to presentations of first fruits at stated times of the year. More importantly, it gave him authority over the conservation and use of the district’s food resources. His authority also derived from his connection with the sky world, its gods, and their superhuman power to accomplish purposes. There was, therefore, a degree of sacredness associated with chiefs.’
[1]
[1]: Goodenough, Ward and Skoggard 1999) Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/5IETI75E. |
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The sources on the administrative structure of Kumasi and Greater Ashante are silent on formal examinations. Some foreigners were employed in highly specialized roles: ’A form of treasury partly staffed by literate Muslims was created. Groups within the capital began to build up expertise in particular areas of administration and to concentrate on this as a way to power and wealth. Careers began to open for those with intelligence, negotiating skill and a steady nerve.’
[1]
Given that their most important qualification seems to have been the command of foreign writing systems, they were probably not examined in a standardized manner by Ashanti superiors. Arhin’s more conservative view of the emerging Ashanti administration (as compared to Wilks’) seems to confirm this: ’But the household ( gyase) organization was bureaucratic only in the sense that the component units were assigned definite tasks around the King’s person and at court. It was not a bureaucratic organization of the type associated with modern states, but patrimonialistic, an instrument of the extension of the King’s personal authority.’ (Yarak, 1983, 1984).’
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[1]: McLeod, M. D. (Malcolm D.) 1981. “Asante”, 17 [2]: Arhin, Kwame 1986. “Asante Praise Poems: The Ideology Of Patrimonialism”, 165 |
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“Through his many regulations for the bureaucracy and its procedures, Joseph sought to establish a unified and equal set of norms throughout the monarchy and to create what oft en sounds like a secular priesthood. During his ten- year reign he issued a steady stream of regulations to micromanage its every aspect of a bureaucrat’s career, from his education to rules for his hiring, promotion, salary levels, punishments, and vacations, as well as to prohibit him from accepting gifts.”
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“The burst of “modernization” in the middle decades of the eighteenth century gave the Habsburg monarchy institutions reasonably advanced for their time. Centralization of power was achieved in large part through the growth of a central bureaucracy, in the Habsburg lands as elsewhere. One estimate has 6,000 members of the state bureaucracy in 1740, 10,000 in 1762, and 20,000 in 1782. These numbers increasingly came from people of non-noble classes, which helped expand the regime’s base of support. Joseph’s travels around the monarchy convinced him that the professionalism of local officials was often low, which inspired his mission to improve the bureaucracy. Thus training was improved, pay increased and tied more to merit, and a pension system introduced.”
[2]
[1]: (Judson 2016: 61) Judson, Pieter M. 2016. The Habsburg Empire: A New History. Cambridge, USA; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/BN5TQZBW [2]: (Curtis 2013: 242) Curtis, Benjamin. 2013. The Habsburgs: The History of a Dynasty. London; New York: Bloomsbury. https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/TRKUBP92 |
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Examination systems have not been mentioned in the sources consulted.
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“Our argument that success in examinations in this period depended more on family relations than on knowledge is supported by the texts themselves. Just before the beginning of our period, Ts’ui I-sun, a member of the famous gentry family which traces its influence back to the second century A.D., "won the ’chin-shih’ degree because of the status of his family" (Chiu Wu-tai-shih 69 :4287d). And in connection with the examination of 955 it was ordered that the custom to give a degree to certain persons without any examination at all or to give a degree because of family status or to persons of respectable families which had been unsuccessful several times should be abolished (Chiu Wu-tai-shih II5 : 4347c). The emperor refused to give his consent to the papers of 12 of the I6 candidates which were recommended to him as good scholars. The wording of this order makes it clear that before 955 the general custom has been to promote any member of the ruling gentry either without an examination or with a sham examination.”
[1]
[1]: (Eberhad 1951: 293) Eberhard, W. 1951. Remarks on the Bureaucracy in North China during the Tenth Century. Oriens 4(2): 280-299. Seshat URL: https://www.zotero.org/groups/1051264/seshat_databank/items/ACFTR6FZ/library |
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